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A PROPOSAL FOR A SIMPLE AND SOCIALLY
EFFECTIVE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
PAUL G. HASKELLt
The Rule Against Perpetuitites is one of the most complex and least
understood areas of the common law. Because of this complexity it has
been the subject ofjudicial and legislative reforms aimed both at simpli-
fying the Rule's application as well as alleviating its sometimes seem-
ingly arbitrary operation.
In this Article Professor Haskell proposes change. First, the Article
examines the common law rule and the societal concerns that brought
about its existence. Next, the Article examines the various reforms that
have been adopted. Third, the Article compares the Rule's purposes to
modern future interests in land and in trusts. Last, the Article proposes
modification of the Rule Against Perpetuities so as to preserve the essen-
tial safeguards against dead hand control of wealth, but in such a way
as to remove most of the uncertainty and confusion concerning the
Rule's application.
I. INTRODUCTION
The classical statement of the Rule Against Perpetuities is brief and decep-
tively simple: no interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest. The
determination of whether or not the future interest complies with the Rule is
made prospectively, from the time of its creation. The question is not whether
the interest in fact vests in interest within the time limit, but rather whether it is
possible that it might vest in interest after the expiration of the time limit.
Viewed from the time of the creation of the contingent future interest, if the
possibility exists that the interest might vest in interest too remotely, however
likely it is that it will vest within the time limit as a practical matter, the interest
is void. This prospective application of the time limit to possible events, the
elusive nature of measuring lives, and the distinction between vested and contin-
gent interests, among other things, make the Rule Against Perpetuities one of
the most difficult areas of our law.
Lawyers frequently create complexity without social purpose. A legal prin-
ciple is legislatively or judicially established to achieve a specific societal objec-
tive. Over time, litigation and sometimes legislation cause the principle to
expand into a massive and complex body of law. In the process the societal
purpose for which the original principle was established is often overlooked. So
it has been with the Rule Against Perpetuities.
t Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. A.B.,
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During the past several decades the Rule has been undergoing a process of
reform. Reformation and "wait-and-see" reforms have been legislated in a
number of states and adopted judicially in several others.' Under "wait-and-
1. Wait-and-see statutes have been enacted in a number of states. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.27.010 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.68 (West Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
381.216 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1970); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501A.01 (West Supp. 1988); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 47-1-17.1 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(C) (Anderson 1976); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6104 (Purdon 1975 & Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (1984); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 27-6-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-5-6 (1983); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3 (1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 11.98.130 (1987); Act of March 17, 1987, ch. 25, § 2, 1987 Nev. Stat. 62, 62-63 (to be codified at
NEV. REv. STAT. ch. 111 (1987)) (adopting the Uniform Rule Against Perpetuities). Several states
have enacted limited wait-and-see statutes in which only those events occurring up to the expiration
of a life or life estate of a person living at the time of the transfer are considered. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45-95 (West 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(2)(a) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 101 (1964); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE ANN. § 11-103(a) (1974); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 184A, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1987). Wait-and-see has also received limited judicial recogni-
tion. See Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 231-32, 97 A.2d 207, 212 (1953); see also
Grynberg v. Amerada Hess Corp., 342 F. Supp. 1314, 1321-22 (D. Colo. 1972) (applying Mississippi
law to what appears to be a purely contractual interest); Hansen v. Stroecker, 699 P.2d 871, 875
(Alaska 1985) (wait-and-see applied after enactment of statute that was not retroactive); Story v.
First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 115 Fla. 436, 443, 156 So. 101, 104 (1934) (implicitly applying wait-and-
see); Warner v. Whitman, 353 Mass. 468, 471-472, 233 N.E.2d 14, 16-17 (1968) (retroactively apply-
ing wait-and-see to trust executed before enactment of statute which was not retroactive, but applica-
tion was unnecessary because trust was valid under common-law rule); Phelps v. Shropshire, 254
Miss. 777, 785, 183 So. 2d 158, 161-62 (1966) (wait-and-see rule applied, but unnecessary because
valid under common-law rule); Nantt v. Pukett Energy Co., 382 N.W.2d 655 (N.D. 1986) (dictum)
(would apply wait-and-see to oil and gas lease); In re Frank, 480 Pa. 116, 124-25, 389 A.2d 536, 541
(1978) (applying wait-and-see rule to gifts in default of appointment).
Reformation statutes have also been enacted in a number of states. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 34.27.010 (1985); CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.5 (West 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.68 (West Supp.
1987); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442,555
(Vernon 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-1-17.1 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08(C)
(Anderson 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 75-78 (West Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-I1-
38 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-6-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-
5-6 (1983); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.043 (Vernon 1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1975);
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-13.3 (1986); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.98.150 (1987); Act of March 17,
1987, ch. 25, § 4, 1987 Nev. Stat. 62, 63 (to be codified at NEv. REV. STAT. ch. 111 (1987)). Several
states have enacted limited reformation statutes that provide for the reduction of age contingencies
to 21 if there is an invalid age contingency greater than 21. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-96
(West 1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(4) (West 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 194(c)(2)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 102 (1964); MD. EST. & TRUSTS CODE
ANN. § 11-103(b) (1974); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184A, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1987); N.Y. EST. POWERS
& TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1967). Several courts have employed the reformation principle
in the absence of a statute to reduce age or time contingencies. In re Estate of Ghiglia, 49 Cal. App.
3d 443, 116 Cal. Rptr. 827 (1974); In re Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 52 Haw. 40, 45-47, 469 P.2d
183, 187 (1970); Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 370-78, 140 So. 2d 843, 848-56 (1962); North Bay
Council Inc., Boy Scouts of America v. Grinnell, 123 N.H. 321, 461 A.2d 114 (1983); Edgerly v.
Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 466-75, 31 A. 900, 911-16 (1891); Berry v. Union Nat'l Bank, 164 W. Va. 258,
264-67, 262 S.E.2d 766, 770-72 (1980); see In re Estate of Kelly, 193 So. 2d 575, 578 (Miss. 1967).
There have been several "patchwork" reforms of the Rule Against Perpetuities. One abolishes
the common-law conclusive presumption of fertility which, under the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities, may invalidate the gift to children or grandchildren of a person who cannot have chil-
dren. Several states have enacted statutes permitting the introduction of evidence to establish that a
person is incapable of having children. Some statutes create a presumption that a person over a
certain age such as 65, or 55 in the case of a woman, is incapable of having children, and that a
person under a certain age, such as 12 in the case of a female and 14 in the case of a male, is
incapable of having children. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(5)(d) (West Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 30, para. 194(c)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-
1.23(e) (McKinney Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-5-112 (1980). Some cases in the property
area have also done away with the conclusive presumption of fertility, including a case involving
perpetuities. See In re Will of Lattouf, 87 N.J. Super. 137, 144, 208 A.2d 411, 415 (1965). Cases
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
see" the determination of the validity of a contingent future interest is made on
the basis of whether it in fact does vest within the period of the Rule, rather than
on the basis of whether the interest must of logical necessity vest, if it ever does,
within the period of the Rule viewed from the time the period begins to run.
2
Under the reformation principle, the contingent future interest that violates the
Rule is reformed to make it conform to the Rule and approximate the intent of
the donor.3 Under the common-law Rule the invalid interest is stricken, caus-
ing a reversion to the transferor or his successors.
In 1979 these reforms were adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Prop-
erty (Donative Transfers), which included a new feature of specifically desig-
nated measuring lives for purposes of wait-and-see. 4 In 1986 the Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities was promulgated. The Uniform Rule
adopts wait-and-see and reformation, and under wait-and-see includes the novel
feature of a ninety-year period in gross as the perpetuities period in lieu of lives
illustrating operation of this presumption in other contexts include Fletcher v. Hurdle, 259 Ark. 640,
646, 536 S.W.2d 109, 113 (1976); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Longshore, 304 So. 2d 287, 289 (Miss.
1974); In re Bassett's Estate, 104 N.H. 504, 507, 190 A.2d 415, 417 (1963); In re Estate of Weeks,
485 Pa. 329, 333-34, 402 A.2d 657, 659 (1979); see also 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 340.1
(3d ed. 1967) (discussing the presumption of fertility prohibiting the termination of a trust).
The relationship between the presumption of fertility and adoption should be noted. Today an
adopted child is likely to be deemed to be included in a class gift to children, grandchildren, descend-
ants, and the like. An elderly person, incapable of having children, may adopt a child. Assuming
fertility is rebuttable, does the inclusion of adopted children within the designated classes of offspring
have the effect of reinstating the conclusive presumption of fertility? It appears to have that effect,
but the Florida, Illinois, and New York statutes provide that for perpetuities purposes the possibility
a person may have a child by adoption is to be disregarded. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(5)(d)
(West Supp. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 194(c)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.23(e) (McKinney Supp. 1987). It should be noted that the patch-
work reforms being discussed are in jurisdictions that do not have the broad wait-and-see reform.
Another "patchwork" reform involves the administrative contingency: testator bequeaths
$50,000 to such issue of his as are living when his estate is finally settled and distributed. This gift
has been held invalid at common law. See Prime v. Hyne, 260 Cal. App. 2d 397, 400-01, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 170, 173 (1968); Ryan v. Beshk, 339 Il. 45, 53-54, 170 N.E. 699, 702 (1930); 3 L. SIMES & A.
SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1228, at 120-21 (2d ed. 1956). There is also contrary
authority that the fiduciary obligation to administer the estate expeditiously precludes a delay of
more than 21 years. See Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 306-08, 27 A. 585, 587-89 (1893); Asche v.
Asche, 42 Del. Ch. 545, 557-59, 216 A.2d 272, 277-80 (1966). Several states have enacted statutes
whose effect is to validate interests of this nature. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(5)(c) (West Supp.
1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 194(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.23(d) (McKinney 1967).
Still another patchwork reform involves the so-called "unborn widow" situation: testator be-
queaths in trust to pay the income to A for life, then to pay the income to A's widow for her life, then
to pay the principal to A's children who are then living. A is 40 years of age at testator's death. The
interest in A's children is invalid under the common-law Rule because A's widow may be a person
who was not living at testator's death. See Dickerson v. Union Nat'l Bank, 268 Ark. 292, 297, 595
S.W.2d 677, 680-81 (1980); Lanier v. Lanier, 218 Ga. 137, 142, 126 S.E.2d 776, 781 (1962); Perkins
v. Iglehart, 183 Md. 520, 527-29, 39 A.2d 672, 677-78 (1944); Brookover v. Grimm, 118 W. Va. 227,
232-34, 190 S.E. 697, 701 (1937). Statutes in several states, however, validate such contingent inter-
ests by presuming that A's widow was intended to be a person who was living at testator's death. See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 715.7 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 689.22(5)(b) (West Supp. 1987); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 30, para. 194(c)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW
§ 9-1.3(c) (McKinney 1967). It should be reiterated that if a broad wait-and-see statute is adopted,
the patchwork reforms are generally unnecessary.
2. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 213-
18 (2d ed. 1984).
3. Id. at 218-22.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) §§ 1.3, 1.4, 1.5 (1983).
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in being plus twenty-one years.5 These reforms have much merit, but more radi-
cal reform is appropriate.
The Rule places a time limit on the power of a property owner to control
the disposition of his wealth. If legal future interests in unborn persons are cre-
ated in a parcel of land, alienability of the parcel is fettered. The original pur-
pose of the Rule was to impose a time limit on dispositive provisions that made
it difficult or impossible to convey a possessory fee in land, thereby effectively
removing the land from commerce.6 That purpose remains relevant today to
dispositions of legal interests in land, but not to dispositions of real or personal
property in trust with a power of sale in the trustee. If a donor transfers land,
stocks, or bonds in trust with equitable future interests in unborn persons, and
empowers the trustee to sell at any time and reinvest the proceeds, alienability of
the property so held has not been fettered in any way. The donor controls who
is to benefit from a changing fund managed by a trustee who is required by law
to invest conservatively. By using this mode of disposition the donor has deter-
mined that a certain quantum of value is going to be channeled into conservative
investment for an extended period of time instead of being invested speculatively
or consumed. Nothing is taken out of commerce; rather, assets are directed into
a certain area of commerce.7 Today most donative future interests are equitable
interests in stocks and debt securities under trusts with a power of sale in the
trustee. In this circumstance a rule based on concerns about alienability needs
to be reexamined.
It is not proposed that there should be unlimited "dead hand" control of
wealth held in trust with a power of sale in the trustee. It makes no sense to
permit an individual to control the benefit or investment of wealth for centuries.
The donor should be permitted to protect his descendants for a reasonable pe-
riod of time, and thereafter the living generation should be permitted to make
the decisions as to the use of the wealth. It is submitted that the massive and
complex body of law dealing with this matter, which is scarcely understood by
the bar, is not necessary to achieve the objectives of the Rule. This Article pro-
poses that the Rule Against Perpetuities be changed in several respects which
would simplify the Rule and make it comport with its modern purpose.
First, legal future interests in land and equitable future interests under
trusts in which the trustee has the power of sale present different problems and
5. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES §§ 1, 3, 8A U.L.A. 80, 86, 105 (Supp. 1987).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIvE TRANSFERS) 5-10 (1981) (Intro-
duction to Part 1); L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 33, 40 (1955); Haskins, Ex-
tending the Grasp of the Dead Hand: Reflections on the Origins of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 126
U. PA. L. REv. 19 (1977).
7. The trustee has the duty to invest in a manner that is designed to produce a reasonable
income and to preserve principal. The hallmark of trustee investment policy is conservatism; signifi-
cant risk-taking for the purpose of realizing large capital gains is not permissible, in the absence of
some specific provision in the trust instrument authorizing or directing speculative investment. Most
states have statutes adopting the "prudent person" rule-that is, a trustee is to invest as a prudent
person would invest his funds. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36A-2 (1984). Prudent people some-
times set aside a small fraction of their portfolios for speculative purposes. The "prudent person"




require separate treatment. In the case of equitable future interests under a trust
with a power of sale in the trustee, the period of the Rule should be changed
from "lives in being plus twenty-one years" to a fixed period that should not be
less than 100 years nor more than 125 years. "Vesting in interest" of the contin-
gent future interest as the event that must occur within the period of the Rule
should be replaced with the principle that the trust must terminate and the fee
simple absolute, legal and equitable, must vest in possession in one or more per-
sons within the period of the Rule.8 The wait-and-see and reformation princi-
ples should also apply. In the case of equitable future interests under a trust in
which the trustee does not have the power of sale over the assets or a specific
asset, the trustee should be deemed to have the power of sale after fifty years,
and otherwise the principles of a fixed period, vesting in possession, wait-and-see
and reformation should be applicable.
In the case of legal future interests in land, the same principles should be
applicable as in the trust with the power of sale. In addition, after fifty years any
person in possession, such as a life tenant, should be unconditionally empowered
to sell the fee simple absolute and have the proceeds held in trust for the inter-
ested parties, with power of sale in the trustee, all pursuant to judicial direction
and control. 9
Significantly, in 1986 Delaware legislated that "the rule against perpetuities
for property held in trust is that at the expiration of 110 years from the date on
which any trust became irrevocable by the trustor, such trust, if not already
terminated by its terms, shall terminate." 10 This statute appears to be the only
perpetuities legislation of its kind. 1
8. Professor John Chipman Gray, in his organizing treatise on the subject, stated it would
have been preferable for the courts to have adopted vesting in possession rather than vesting in
interest. J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 821-22 (4th ed. 1942). Professor Lewis
Simes has discussed the advisability of adopting vesting in possession. Simes, The Policy Against
Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 737-38 (1955). Professor Daniel Schuyler has advocated this
principle. Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?, 56 MICH. L. REv. 887,
926 (1958). Professor Philip Mechem also thought vesting in possession was preferable. Mechem,
Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 965, 970 (1959).
Last, Professor Jesse Dukeminer has stated that vesting in possession would have better served the
objectives of the Rule. See, Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuitites, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1867,
1869 (1986).
9. In Great Britain, by statute, the only purely legal estates that can be created are the fee
simple absolute and the term of years. If other legal interests are created, such as a life estate and
remainder or reversion, a trust with power of sale is deemed to exist for the benefit of those who were
given legal interests in the instrument of transfer. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, ch. 20; see
R. MEGARRY & H. WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 134 (4th ed. 1975); Bostick, Loosening
the Grip of the Dead Hand: Shall We Abolish Legal Future Interests in Land?, 32 VAND. L. REv.
1061, 1093-94 (1979).
The generalization in the text must be qualified to deal with the following type of transfer: To A
in fee, but if the premises are used for other than single-family residential purposes, then to B in fee.
It would make no sense to empower A to sell in fee simple absolute after 50 years and have the
proceeds held in trust under the terms of the original disposition. In this situation, the executory
interest would cease to exist after 50 years, and A would own the fee simple absolute.
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 503(b) (Supp. 1986).
11. The Delaware statute provides for distribution of the assets to those who would take on
termination pursuant to the terms of the trust. Id. § 503(c). The Illinois statute provides that if a
trust violates the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities, the trust shall terminate 21 years after the
death of the last to die of all beneficiaries living at the time of its creation, and be distributed to the
1988]
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This proposal is concerned only with noncharitable donative transfers.
Commercial transactions such as options, leases, and the variety of trusts in a
business context involve different considerations. Similarly, the proposal is not
concerned with charitable trusts or nontrust transfers of a wholly charitable na-
ture. Existing law places no time limit on charitable trusts and any reversionary
interests therein, and no change is proposed here. Further, a future interest in a
charity following a present interest in a charity is not subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities under existing law, and no change is proposed.
II. THE PROBLEMS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF THE REFORMS
The complexity of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, and the ar-
bitrary results it sometimes produces, result from several factors: the prospec-
tive application of the time limit of the Rule to the range of possible events; the
elusive quality of the measuring lives necessary for validity; the distinction be-
tween the future interest that is contingent and the future interest that is vested,
vested with enjoyment postponed, or vested subject to divestment; the "all-or-
nothing" class gift rule, which provides that if the interest of any member of a
class violates the Rule, the entire class gift is invalid; and the mechanical exci-
sion of the future interest that violates the Rule, causing a dispositive vacuum
that is usually filled by a reversion.
The wait-and-see reform replaces the prospective application of the time
limit to the range of possible events with the determination of validity on the
basis of events that actually occur. Note that if the contingent future interest is
valid under the common-law Rule, there is no need to wait to determine validity.
If as a matter of logical necessity the interest must vest, if it ever does, within the
period of the Rule, then obviously it is valid if one waits for it to vest within the
period of the Rule. Only if the interest is invalid under the common-law Rule is
there any need to wait to determine validity.
On its face the wait-and-see reform appears sound. It seems unnecessarily
harsh to invalidate a future interest ab initio on the basis of far-fetched hypothet-
ical facts. For example, testator bequeaths in trust to pay the income to A for
life, and on A's death to pay the principal to A's children who survive A and live
to age twenty-five. At testator's death A is living, as are three children of A, ages
eighteen, twenty, and twenty-two. Under the traditional Rule the contingent
remainder to A's children is invalid because A may have another child whose
interest may vest more than twenty-one years after the deaths of A and his three
children and, indeed, after the deaths of everyone else on earth who was living at
testator's death. If the interest of any member of the class violates the Rule, the
entire class gift fails. However, it is unlikely that A will have another child or
adopt another child. If he did, it is highly unlikely that A and the other three
children would all die before that child reaches four years of age. In all likeli-
heirs of the transferor as if he had died at the termination, unless the trust has terminated earlier in
accordance with its terms. ILL. ANN. STAT. cl. 30, para. 195 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
[Vol. 66
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hood the class gift, which is invalid under the common-law Rule, will be valid
under wait-and-see.
When one scratches the surface, however, problems with wait-and-see ap-
pear with respect to the measuring lives. Bear in mind that wait-and-see is used
only if the contingent future interest violates the common-law Rule. Thus, mea-
suring lives as they exist under the common-law Rule are not logically identifi-
able under wait-and-see. How does one determine measuring lives under wait-
and-see? It has been maintained that any life having a reasonable relationship to
the future interest in question may be a measuring life.
In the preceding example-income to A for life, remainder to A's children
who survive A and live to age twenty-five-suppose that A has another child one
year after testator's death, and one month after the birth, A, A's spouse, and the
other three children of A die in a plane crash. The next-door neighbor of A, who
was living at testator's death, is living when the afterborn child of A reaches age
four. Does the neighbor's life validate the gift to the afterborn child? It is gener-
ally agreed that an extraneous life, such as the neighbor's, cannot serve as a
measuring life under wait-and-see.12
Let us assume that A is living when the afterborn child reaches age four. It
is universally accepted that A can serve as a measuring life. Several explanations
are available. A has a relationship to the future interest in question as the holder
of the preceding life estate whom the children must survive. 13 A has a beneficial
interest in the property that is the subject of the future interest in question. 14 A
would serve as a validating life under the common-law Rule for a similar but
different future interest, such as remainder to the children of A who survive A
and live to age twenty-one.15 These explanations have been subsumed under the
reasonable relationship standard.
Assume A dies before the afterborn child reaches age four, but the other
three children of A are living when the fourth child reaches age four. It is gener-
ally accepted that the three children can serve as measuring lives because they
are members of the class whose future interest is in question, and clearly are
related lives.
16
Let us assume that A is the father and that A and his three children, who
are all living at testator's death, die before the afterborn child reaches age four,
but the mother of all the children is alive when the fourth child reaches age four.
12. See discussions in Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky.
L.J. 3, 62-63 (1960); Jones, Measuring Lives Under the Pennsylvania Statutory Rule Against Perpetu-
ities, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 54, 59-60 (1960); Maudsley, Perpetuities: Reforming the Common Law
Rule-How to Wait and See, 60 CORNELL L. Rv. 355, 367 (1975); Waggoner, Perpetuity Reform,
81 MICH. L. REV. 1718, 1767 (1983).
13. See P. BREGY, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES ACT OF 1947 5269-71 (1949); Leach,
Perpetuities Legislation: Hail, Pennsylvanial, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1124, 1145 (1960); Waggoner,
supra note 12, at 1767.
14. See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 1767.
15. T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 2, at 214-15.
16. Note that the three children would not serve as validating lives under the common-law
Rule for the similar but different gift of the remainder to the children of A who survive A and live to
age 21; this is so because the other three children could die one day after the testator's death, and A
could have a fourth child one year after the testator's death.
1988]
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Is she a permissible measuring life under wait-and-see? She is not a beneficiary
under the trust, and she has no relationship to the gift in question except as the
parent of a beneficiary. Is she reasonably related to the future interest? She may
well be considered an extraneous life, although the matter is not free from
doubt. 17 The spouses of the three children living at the testator's death would
undoubtedly be ineligible as measuring lives; they simply have no relationship to
the future interest.
Suppose testator bequeaths in trust to pay the income to his children A and
B, in equal parts, for their lives, and on the death of each, to pay one-half the
principal to the child's children who survive the child and live to age twenty-five.
A, B, and C, a child of A, age five, are living at testator's death. The remainders
are invalid under the common-law Rule. B has a child two years after testator's
death. B dies before his child reaches age four, but A and C are alive at that
time. Are A and C measuring lives under wait-and-see? They bear no relation-
ship to the gift to the afterborn child, except that they are beneficiaries of the
other half of the trust. That relationship is probably sufficient, but the matter is
not completely clear.
Let us assume that testator bequeaths and devises his entire estate in trust,
to pay the income to A for life, then to A's children for their lives, and on the
death of the survivor of A's children, to pay the principal to A's grandchildren.
At testator's death only A is living. Under the common-law Rule the life estates
in the children of A are valid, but the remainder in the grandchildren is invalid.
Suppose A later has one child, C, who survives A and has one child, GC. C dies
twenty-five years after A's death, survived by GC. At C's death testator's sole
heir, B, his brother, is living. B had a reversionary interest. Is B reasonably
related to the remainder in A's grandchildren? That may be the case, but no one
knows for sure.
The imprecise nature of the permissible measuring lives under wait-and-see
has brought about the enactment of modified wait-and-see statutes, which at-
tempt to define measuring lives by disallowing "any lives whose continuance
does not have a causal relationship to the vesting or failure of the interest."18
What lives qualify under this definition? Assume testator bequeaths $100,000 to
the grandchildren of A who reach age twenty-one. At testator's death, A, two
children of A, and three grandchildren of A, are living, but no grandchild has
reached twenty-one. The interests of the grandchildren are invalid under the
common-law Rule because of the possibility of afterborn children of A whose
children could take beyond the period of the Rule. It has been maintained that
under such a statute the lives having a causal relationship to the vesting or fail-
ure of the grandchildren's interests are A and the children and grandchildren of
A living at the testator's death. A is a measuring life because he may have a
child who may have a child who may take; A's children are measuring lives
because they may have children who may take; A's grandchildren are measuring
17. See Waggoner, supra note 12, at 1768.
18. ALASKA STAT. § 34.27.010 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (Michie/Bobbs-Mer-
rill 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-1-17.1 (Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (1984).
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lives because they may take. 19
What about the other parent of the living children of A, and the parents of
the living grandchildren of A other than the children ofA ? It is maintained that
they are not measuring lives because they are redundant-after the deaths of
their respective spouses they cannot affect the identity of the grandchildren who
take.20
Assume that in this example a provision excludes grandchildren by adop-
tion and natural children of adopted children of A. Do A and his two children
alive at the testator's death cease to be measuring lives once they cease to be
capable of having children because the continuance of their lives cannot have a
causal relationship to vesting or failure? If that is the case, are their lives there-
after ignored, or are they treated as having "died" when they become infertile?
2 1
Suppose testator bequeaths in trust to A for life, remainder in fee to the
children of A who live to age 25. A and two children of A, ages ten and twenty-
six, are living at testator's death. It has been maintained that A and the two
children of A are measuring lives under the "causal relationship" criterion. 22 In
what respect is the continuance of the life of the twenty-six-year-old child caus-
ally related to vesting or failure? That child's interest is already vested.
Assume testator bequeaths in trust to pay the income to A for life, then to
pay the income to the children of A for their respective lives, and on the death of
each child of A, to pay to the children of such child a percentage of the principal
equal to the percentage of the income the parent was receiving. At testator's
death A is alive, one child of A, Cl, is alive, and A has no grandchildren. Under
the common-law Rule the children of each child of A constitute a separate class
for perpetuities purposes; the remainder to the children of C1 is valid because C1
is a life in being, but remainders to children of unborn children of A are invalid.
Five years later C2 is born to A. A then dies and twenty-five years thereafter C2
dies leaving children surviving him. C1 is alive at C2 's death. Is the remainder
to the children of C2 valid under the causal relationship test, using C1 as the
causally related life? It seems that Cl's life is causally related only in the sense
that Cl's existence is related to the size of the remainder interest, but it does not
appear to be related to the failure or the vesting of the remainder as those words
are generally understood. In addition, the size of the remainder interest in C2 's
children is determined at A's death; Cl's continued existence thereafter does not
19. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 847-51 (3d ed. 1984). Pro-
fessor Dukeminier is the architect and principal advocate of the causal relationship test. For very
different analyses of this example, which illustrate the difficulty with the causal relationship 'crite-
rion, see COMMITTEE ON RULES AGAINST PERPETUITIES, SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE
AND TRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PERPETUITY LEGISLATION HANDBOOK (3d ed.
1967), reprinted in 2 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 176, 185 (1967) [hereinafter COMMITrEE ON
RULES AGAINST PERPETUITIES]; Maudsley, supra note 12, at 374.
20. See Dukeminier, Perpetuities: The Measuring Lives, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1648, 1651 (1985).
21. This example assumes that the presumption of fertility is rebuttable, which although not the
rule in a majority of states, is the trend. Statutes and cases have abolished the traditional conclusive
presumption of fertility. See supra note 1.
22. Dukeminier, supra note 20, at 1667.
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affect the size.2
3
Assume testator devises Blackacre to X in fee, but if Blackacre is ever used
for other than single-family residential purposes, then to Yin fee. Twenty years
later X transfers to A who was not living at testator's death, and Y transfers to B
who was not living at testator's death. What lives in being are causally related
to the vesting or failure of B's (Y's) interest? When does the perpetuities period
end?
24
It is apparent that the "causal relationship" test does little to clarify the
problem of measuring lives under wait-and-see. The disagreements among aca-
demicians over its meaning convincingly establish this point.
In 1979 the perpetuities provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Property
(Donative Transfers) were promulgated. 25 These provisions included wait-and-
see, and purported to clarify the issue of measuring lives thereunder by stating
specifically who they are:
(2)... [T]he measuring lives for purposes of the rule against perpetu-
ities ... are:
(a) The transferor if the period of the rule begins to run in the
transferor's lifetime; and
(b) Those individuals alive when the period of the rule begins to
run, if reasonable in number, who have beneficial interests vested or
contingent in the property in which the non-vested interest in question
exists and the parents and grandparents alive when the period of the
rule begins to run of all beneficiaries of the property in which the non-
vested interest exists; and
(c) The donee of a nonfiduciary power of appointment alive when
the period of the rule begins to run if the exercise of such power could
affect the non-vested interest in question.
26
Subsection (1) of section 1.3 of the Restatement, immediately preceding the sub-
section quoted above, provides that a future interest which complies with the
common-law Rule is valid.27 It is only if the interest fails to comply with the
common-law Rule that wait-and-see comes into play using the specifically desig-
nated lives.
The Restatement definition of lives has its complications. A class of benefi-
ciaries may have no living members, yet the "parents" and "grandparents" of
the unborn are included, and this is so even if no member of the class ever comes
into existence. If the class is the unborn children of A, A's wife and her parents
23. This analysis appears in T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 2, at 217. See the discussion
of this example in COMMITTEE ON RULES AGAINST PERPETUITIES, supra note 19, at 185.
24. For a heated disagreement over this perplexing causal relationship problem, see
Dukeminier, supra note 20, at 1659-74, 1705; Waggoner, Perpetuities: A Perspective on Wait-and.
See, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1714, 1719-24 (1985); Dukeminier, A Response by Professor Dukeminier, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1730 (1985); Waggoner, A Rejoinder by Professor Waggoner, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1739 (1985); Dukeminier, A Final Comment by Professor Dukeminier, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1742
(1985).
25. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.1-1.6 (1983).
26. Id. § 1.3(2).
27. See id. § 1.3(1).
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are measuring lives, but will cease to be when A divorces her and marries an-
other, who then becomes a measuring life together with her parents. If the class
is the children of A and several exist, the mother (A's wife) is a measuring life as
are her parents, and they will continue to be when A divorces her and marries
another, who then becomes a measuring life together with her parents. Also, a
parent who is a measuring life may cease to be if the child is adopted by others
who then become measuring lives.28 Presumably if a beneficiary assigns her in-
terest to another, the assignee and his parents and grandparents become measur-
ing lives, and the assignor and her parents and grandparents cease to be
measuring lives.29 Keeping track of measuring lives could become very compli-
cated. Iowa has legislated the Restatement concept and expanded it to include
the descendants of grandparents as measuring lives.
3 0
The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (USRAP),3 1 promul-
gated in 1986, provides in part as follows:
SECTION 1. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
(a) A nonvested property interest is invalid unless:
(1) when the interest is created, it is certain to vest or terminate no
later than 21 years after the death of an individual then alive; or
(2) the interest either vests or terminates within 90 years after its
creation.
32
As does the Restatement, the USRAP validates contingent future interests
that are valid under the common-law Rule.33 Alternatively, if the contingent
future interest is not valid under the common-law Rule, wait-and-see is em-
ployed to validate it if it vests within ninety years after its creation.34 For pur-
poses of wait-and-see, the USRAP gives up on measuring lives because of the
definitional and administrative difficulties just examined.3 5 Ninety years was
chosen as an approximation of the maximum duration available to transferors
under the common-law Rule and under wait-and-see reforms using lives in being
plus twenty-one years. The reasoning is that the transferor may have a child or
grandchild, aged five or six at the time of the transfer, who has a life expectancy
in the seventies, thereby making ninety an approximation of the maximum com-
mon-law period available.36 The USRAP allows an interest to vest more than
ninety years after its creation if it complies with the common-law Rule, but if it
does not comply with the common-law Rule it is valid only if it vests not later
28. Id. § 1.3 comment e (1981).
29. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.
J. 569, 576 (1986).
30. IOWA CODE ANN. § 558.68 (West Supp. 1987).
31. 8A U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 1987).
32. UNIF. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUrriES § 1, 8A U.L.A. 80, 86 (Supp. 1987). For a
critical examination of the difficulties with the USRAP approach see Dukeminier, The Uniform
Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1023 (1987).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.3(1) (1983); UNIF.
STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUrriEs § l(a)(1), 8A U.L.A. 80, 86 (Supp. 1987).
34. UNio. STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1(a)(2), 8A U.L.A. 80, 86 (Supp. 1987).
35. Waggoner, supra note 29, at 575.
36. Waggoner, supra note 29, at 579.
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than that approximation of the maximum period available under the common-
law Rule. The USRAP is designed to achieve the objectives of the Restatement
wait-and-see, and other forms of wait-and-see that use lives in being plus twenty-
one years as the period, without their difficulties. Minnesota, Nevada, and
South Carolina have legislated the USRAP.
37
That is the state of wait-and-see reform. Note that there has been and still
is opposition to wait-and-see. One objection is the problem of the measuring
lives. Another objection involves the uncertainty of title during the wait-and-see
period.38 Under the common-law Rule the contingent future interest is valid or
invalid from the beginning; in theory, all one has to do is apply logic to find the
answer. This certainty, however, is often more apparent than real when one con-
siders the constructional problems that frequently arise in connection with per-
petuities questions, and the doctrine of infectious invalidity.39 Under wait-and-
see, of course, it may take a while to determine if the contingent future interest is
valid. Uncertainty of a similar nature, however, seems to inhere in the contin-
gent future interest that complies with the common-law Rule in the sense that
one does not know if the condition will be satisfied.
A further objection to wait-and-see is that major reform is unnecessary be-
cause of the small amount of litigation concerning perpetuities issues.40 It is
certainly true that the number of reported cases in the perpetuities area is sur-
prisingly small. It is also true that practitioners specializing in trusts and estates
often do not pretend to be familiar with the esoterica of the Rule. It may be that
lawyers make a practice of not coming anywhere near the limits of the Rule
because of their fear of it. Be that as it may, there is no justification for complex-
ity in the law that serves no social purpose. Wait-and-see reforms, if properly
drafted, do simplify the problem.
The other major reform of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities is cy
pres, or reformation. This principle permits the court to reform a future interest
that violates the Rule Against Perpetuities to make it conform to the Rule in a
manner approximating the intention of the donor. The Restatement, the US-
RAP, and a number of state statutes have adopted reformation. 41 There is gen-
37. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501A.01 to .07 (West Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-7 (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1987); Act of March 17, 1987, ch. 25, 1987 Nev. Stat. 62 (to be codified at NEV. REV.
STAT. ch. 111 (1987)).
38. See Maudsley, supra note 12, at 364; Mechem, supra note 8, at 979; Simes, Is the Rule
Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait and See" Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REV. 179, 188 (1953);
Waggoner, supra note 12, at 1771-72.
39. Infectious invalidity means that if the invalidation of a future interest as a perpetuities
violation substantially distorts the transferor's dispositive plan, present or future interests that are
otherwise valid may also be stricken if this would effect more closely the perceived dispositive pur-
pose of the transferor. See T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL, supra note 2, at 208-10.
40. See 5A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 827H (1987); L. SIMES, supra note 6,
at 64; Bloom, Perpetuities Refinement: There is an Alternative, 62 WASH. L. REV. 23, 35 (1987);
Mechem, supra note 8, at 966; Waterbury, Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform, 42 MINN.
L. REV. 41, 79 (1957).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.5 (1983); UNII.
STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 3, 8A U.L.A. 80, 105 (Supp. 1987); supra note 1.
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eral agreement that reformation is sound.42
All the proposed reforms and almost all the statutory reforms retain the
common-law perpetuities principle of vesting in interest within the time limit as
the determinant for validity. That determinant involves the esoteric distinctions
between vested and contingent, vested with enjoyment postponed and contin-
gent, vested subject to divestment and contingent, and the concomitant sophis-
try. Furthermore, the vesting in interest of a legal future interest in land does
not remove the fetters from alienability. The party or parties necessary to con-
vey the fee can be identified after vesting, but the present and future interest
holders must all agree to convey and agree on their shares of the proceeds of
sale. Vesting in interest as the determinant of validity is true complexity without
societal purpose. The determinant for validity should be vesting in possession
within the time period; this idea was recognized as the sounder principle almost
a century ago by none other than John Chipman Gray.4 3 Vesting in possession,
when combined with wait-and-see and a fixed period, is simple and effects the
objectives of the Rule.
The perpetuities principle that a class gift is invalid in its entirety if the
interest of any member of the class violates the Rule has often been criticized.
The only policy justification for this all-or-nothing result is that the donor would
prefer that no member receive any benefit if one member could not. This result
may be preferred in some instances but not in others. In any event, reformation
removes the sting of this sometimes harsh rule because the court can modify the
invalidating interest to make it conform to the Rule. The wat-and-see reform
also makes it less likely that the interest of some class members will be invalid
and others will be valid.
42. Certain "patchwork" reforms involving the presumption of fertility, the "unborn widow"
situation, and the "administrative contingency" situation, are discussed supra note 1.
Wait-and-see has been described as a statutory "saving clause." Sophisticated draftsmen often
include a saving clause in their dispositive instruments when appropriate to protect against a perpe-
tuities violation under the common-law Rule. For example, testator bequeaths in trust to pay the
income to A for life, then to pay the income to the children of A for their respective lives, and on the
death of each child of A, to pay to the issue of such child a percentage of the principal equal to the
percentage of income to which such child was entitled. A and one child (Cl) were living at testator's
death. Under the traditional rule, the remainder to the issue of C1 is valid, but the remainder to the
issue of any afterborn children of A is invalid. To deal with this problem, the draftsman adds a
saving clause as follows: ".... provided that if the trust has not terminated within 21 years following
the death of the survivor of A and C1, it shall terminate at that time and the remaining principal
shall be distributed to the individuals then receiving the income in the same proportions that they
were entitled to the income." The likelihood is substantial that the trust will run its intended course
within the lives of A and C1 plus 21 years. A and C1 become, in effect, wait-and-see lives established
by the draftsman.
Wait-and-see reforms provide, in effect, that if the draftsman fails to create "wait-and-see lives"
by a saving clause, such lives are created by operation of law. The Uniform Statutory Rule substi-
tutes 90 years for actual lives in being plus 21 years, as an approximation of the maximum period
available under a saving clause. The draftsman's saving clause provides for disposition in the event
the trust is prematurely terminated; the statutory counterpart to this is the judicial power of
reformation.
43. See supra note 8.
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III. A SIMPLE AND SOCIALLY EFFECTIVE RULE
It is clear that dead hand control of legal interests in real property is a
different issue from dead hand control of equitable interests under a trust in
which the trustee has a power of sale.44 The original purpose of the Rule
Against Perpetuities was to place a time limit on the indirect fettering of aliena-
bility of real property. 45 The existence of legal future interests in land indirectly
fetters alienability. This results from the absence of a market for anything but a
fee interest; if title is divided among several different people or classes in time
sequence, including usually those who are unborn at the time of the transfer, the
conveyance of the fee is either impossible or very difficult to effect. Even if all
the future interests are vested it is difficult to convey the fee because of the
number of individuals who must agree to the sale and the valuation of their
shares. It is true that equity may authorize, and some statutes provide for, the
sale of the fee on the petition of a holder of a present or future interest, with the
proceeds to be held for the benefit of the interested parties, but such a sale re-
quires a showing that retention of the land is significantly disadvantageous to the
petitioner.
46
On the other hand, if a trust is created in which the trustee has the power of
sale over property held in trust, alienability has not been fettered in any way. A
time limit is imposed in this situation, because it is deemed socially undesirable
for other reasons to permit dead hand control of wealth. Most future interests
today are equitable future interests under trusts, and trustees almost invariably
have the power of sale.
A. Trust With Power of Sale
Why should society be concerned that a trust lasts for hundreds of years so
long as the trustee has power to sell and reinvest the assets? The people of South
Dakota and Wisconsin are not concerned; legislation in those states permits such
a trust to last in perpetuity.47
One argument for a time limit is that the trust assets are invariably chan-
neled into conservative investments. Risk capital is necessary in a private enter-
prise system, and a perpetual trust would limit the availability of such capital.
Family trusts, however, constitute a very small portion of available investment
44. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9.
45. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
46. Ball v. Curtis, 276 Ark. 498, 637 S.W.2d 571 (1982); Dunn v. Sanders, 243 Ga. 684, 256
S.E.2d 366 (1979); Baker v. Weedon, 262 So. 2d 641 (Miss. 1972); Caine v. Griffin, 232 S.C. 562, 103
S.E.2d 37 (1958); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-4-8-1 (Burns 1980); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-
110 (1981); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 183, § 49 (Law. Co-op. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-11 (1984);
see L. SIMES & A. SMIH, supra note 1, §§ 1941-46; Rogers, Removal of Future Interest Encum-
brances--Sale of the Fee Simple Estate, 17 VAND. L. REv. 1437 (1964); Annotation, Court's Power to
Order Sale of Property Subject to Legal Life Estate In Order to Relieve Economic Distress of Life
Tenant, 57 A.L.R.3D 1189 (1974).
47. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-5-4 (1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West 1981).




capital.48 Pension trusts, which are subject to a modified form of the prudent
person rule,4 9 constitute a much larger portion, are growing at a more rapid rate
than family trusts,50 and are exempted from the Rule Against Perpetuities by
statute as they must be if they are to function. Investment companies, 51 insur-
ance companies,5 2 and direct private investment5 3 are far more significant in-
vestment factors than family trusts. There is no shortage of risk capital now. If
a shortage of risk capital should develop, family trusts would be a very small
part of the problem.
Another argument for a time limit on family trusts is that the current gen-
eration rather than the deceased ancestor should be permitted to choose how to
use the capital. What would the current generation at any given time do differ-
ently that would be socially preferable? The current generation might choose to
use the wealth for consumption rather than investment. In modem times our
economy is considered to be suffering from too little saving in relation to con-
sumption. A time may come, of course, when the reverse is true; this would,
however, require a radical change in the American character. In any event,
family trusts constitute a very small portion of disposable wealth. Also, the cur-
rent generation might choose to add to the availability of risk capital but, again,
family trusts are not a major source of capital.
Another argument for a time limit is that trusts create and perpetuate
socio-economic advantage and class distinction. These attributes are permitted
under the present Rule for a generation or two. When the trust comes to an end
under the present Rule, the descendants of the settlor have three choices. They
can reestablish the trust for succeeding generations, pass it on outright to the
next generation, or consume it. The first two actions maintain the class advan-
tage. Viewed in isolation, consumption presumably is not preferable to contin-
ued investment, but it does have the effect of terminating the socio-economic
advantage to the family line.
54
We have been examining the question of a time limit in terms of reasons for
imposing it. The reasons are significant but not compelling. It is appropriate to
examine the question from the standpoint of why a property owner should be
allowed to control the benefit of wealth without a time limit. What societal
48. As of 1984, the total amount held in personal trusts by banks insured by the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation and noninsured banks in the Federal Reserve System was approxi-
mately $276 billion. FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, TRUST ASSETS
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS-1984, at 16 table 1.
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(A)(1) (1982); 29 C.F.R. 2550.404a-I (1987); B. LONGSTRETH, MOD-
ERN INvEsTMENT MANAGEMENT AND THE PRUDENT MAN RULE 32-36 (1986).
50. As of 1985, $1,705.9 billion was held in public and private pension funds. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1987, at 354 table 598 (107th ed. 1987).
51. As of 1985, $495 billion was held by mutual funds. Id. at 497 table 841.
52. As of 1985, life insurance companies held assets of $825.9 billion. Id. at 497 table 842.
53. As of 1985, individuals held $1,549.4 billion in corporate stock, and $1,016.5 billion in debt
securities. Id. at 476 table 795.
54. It should be noted that the trust for two or more successive generations junior to the trans-
feror no longer avoids the impact of a capital tax at each generation as in the past. The generation-
skipping tax imposes, in effect, an estate tax on the principal at the termination of each generation's
interest.
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objective would be furthered by such dispositive power? We allow the property
owner to dispose of his wealth during life or at his death as an aspect of owner-
ship. The institution of private property exists for the reason, among others,
that it is conducive to productivity. But experience clearly establishes that a
reasonable time limit upon the dispositive power, as under the common-law
Rule, does not inhibit industry.
The law allows a donor to create a trust whose duration is unlimited if its
purposes are exclusively charitable. 55 The social benefit of the charitable pur-
pose outweighs the social interest in limiting dead hand control of the invest-
ment and disposition of wealth. Under the judicial cy pres power, however, the
dispositive terms of the trust may be changed if the purposes cease to be func-
tional. This mechanism adjusts the charitable trust for changing circumstances.
The exercise of control over the disposition of wealth for ten generations or
more for private, noncharitable purposes serves no apparent societal interest.
On the other hand, there are reasons for limiting the duration of trusts with
power of sale, although they are not compelling. A time limit probably should
exist, but it is not important that it be very short or that it be defined in a highly
technical manner that produces a massive and complex body of law. In other
words, the present Rule Against Perpetuities with all its complexity is not neces-
sary to achieve the desired objective in the case of a trust with a power of sale.
The existing Rule is structured to permit the donor to control the benefit of
his property for the immediately following generation or generations whose
members are living, plus twenty-one years thereafter to provide for the situation
of the immaturity of the ultimate takers or any other contingency the donor
wishes within that gross time period. The vast majority of trusts that are calcu-
lated to achieve such an objective terminate before one hundred years from the
time of creation because the lives in being who are benefited do not live more
than seventy-nine years from the creation of the trust, and the contingency, if
one exists, which triggers the ultimate disposition thereafter does not require
twenty-one additional years. On the other hand, a trust calculated to achieve
those objectives may last over 100 years if the lives in being who are benefited
are very young when the trust is created. The likelihood of any such trust last-
ing 125 years is extremely remote. If from the standpoint of societal conse-
quences it does not make a great deal of difference whether the trust lasts 50
years or 80 years or 125 years, why not discard all the pointless learning sur-
rounding lives in being plus twenty-one years and the vesting of contingent inter-
ests, and adopt the simple rule that in the case of a trust with power of sale, the
trust must terminate and the assets must become the absolute property of an
individual or individuals within 125 years of its creation? Again, 125 years is
not a magical number; the period may be reduced but it should not be reduced
below 100 years.
This rule would allow the lawyer to prepare a trust to satisfy the desires of
the overwhelming majority of donors without fear of violating the limits of the
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (DONATIVE TRANSFERS) § 1.6 (1983); UNIF.
STAT. RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 4(5), 8A U.L.A. 80, 109 (Supp. 1987).
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Rule Against Perpetuities. The testator who wishes to exploit the limits of the
rule-125 years--could probably create a trust for his children for their lives,
his grandchildren for their lives, his great-grandchildren for their lives, and re-
mainder outright to his great-great-grandchildren, assuming the testator dies at
age 80 and his youngest child is 40, and the generational age relationship contin-
ues successively. Is a trust of that nature socially undesirable? It seems the
desire to protect family for several generations is an admirable one, the effectua-
tion of which should not be denied absent seriously adverse social or economic
consequences. Any adverse consequences do not appear to be serious.5 6 Under
the existing Rule, the calculating testator could often keep the trust going for
100 years or more if he had very young children or grandchildren living at his
death.
The proposed rule of vesting in fee in possession within 125 years, or a
shorter period but not less than 100 years, also contemplates the applicability of
the wait-and-see and reformation principles. In the vast majority of situations
the trust will terminate within the period of the Rule. Suppose testator creates a
trust for several generations, which does not provide for termination after 125
years, and which turns out, after waiting and seeing, to violate the Rule. The
proposed rule does not operate to leave the present interest, such as a life estate
existing at the 125-year deadline, intact to run its course. Rather, the trust ter-
minates at the end of 125 years. It is proposed that the principal then be distrib-
uted to the parties receiving the income at that time, in the shares they were
receiving it or in equal shares if the income distribution is discretionary. The
disposition of the principal would be subject to the power of the court, pursuant
to the reformation principle, to order a different distribution on the petition of
an interested party, if such appeared to be more consonant with the transferor's
dispositive purpose.
Although almost all trusts provide for a power of sale in the trustee, occa-
sionally the trustee is not given the power or is forbidden from selling a specific
asset. It is proposed that after the trust has been in existence for fifty years, the
trustee would be deemed to have the power of sale by operation of law. In all
respects, the perpetuities principles described above would also apply.
B. Legal Interests in Land
The existence of legal future interests in land presents several different con-
siderations from equitable future interests under a trust with power of sale.
Legal future interests in land tend to fetter alienability because they make it
difficult to convey the fee.57 If the future interests are contingent because the
holders are unborn, it is peculiarly difficult to convey the fee. But even if the
future interests are vested, which requires that the holders be presently identifi-
able, alienability is nevertheless fettered because it takes the joinder of the hold-
ers of successive interests to convey the fee. One of several holders of the
56. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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interests may choose not to sell, or if all wish to sell, they may not be able to
agree on the division of the proceeds. The point is that vesting in interest does
not make the land easily alienable. The fetters on alienability are removed when
the only interest is the present fee. Whatever time limit is imposed on the crea-
tion of future interests, compliance with it should require the fee to vest in pos-
session rather than vest in interest.
It is true that equity may authorize, and some statutes provide for, the sale
of the fee on the petition of a holder of a present or future interest, with the
proceeds to be held for the benefit of the interested parties. Such a sale, how-
ever, requires a showing that retention of the land is significantly disadvanta-
geous to the petitioner.
58
The testator who creates a legal life estate in land in one person with re-
mainder in fee in that person's issue is thinking of keeping the land in the family.
His plan necessarily fetters alienability. The present time limit of lives in being
plus twenty-one years can have the effect of fettering alienability for over 100
years. In most cases involving a life estate and remainder in fee, however, alien-
ability will be fettered for not more than fifty years. An eighty-year-old testator
who leaves his fifty-year-old daughter a life estate with remainder to her children
ties up the property probably for only thirty or forty years.
It is proposed, subject to qualifications set forth below, that in the case of
legal present and future interests in land, any holder of a present interest would
have the unconditional power to sell the fee simple absolute after fifty years.
The proceeds of the sale would be held in trust, with power of sale in the trustee,
in accordance with the terms of the original disposition. 9 The court would
supervise the sale of the fee, appoint the trustee, and establish the administrative
terms of the trust. If no sale occurs, the fee simple absolute must vest in posses-
sion within 125 years; if there is a sale, the trust must end and the fee simple
absolute, legal and equitable, in the trust assets must vest in possession within
125 years. Again, there is no magic in 125 years; the period may be reduced but
it should not be less than 100 years. The same reformation and wait-and-see
principles applicable to the transfer that is originally in trust, described above,
would be applicable to the transfer of legal interests in land whether or not it
becomes transformed into a trust. If the transfer is to several successive genera-
tions of the transferor, and after 125 years the fee has not vested in possession,
the dispositive provisions cease to be effective, and the fee in possession is
deemed to be in the holders of the present interest or those who are receiving the
income at the time, as the case may be. This disposition would be subject to the
power of the court to order a different disposition, pursuant to the reformation
principle, on the petition of an interested party, if such appeared to be more
consonant with the transferor's intent.
58. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
59. This sale and the trust thereby created effectively turn legal interests in land into equitable
interests in trust proceeds, which as previously discussed, do not implicate alienability concerns.




Occasionally a donor creates legal interests in land such as the following:
Blackacre to A in fee, but if the land is ever used for other than single-family
residential purposes, then to B in fee. It would make no sense to give A the
power to sell the fee simple absolute after fifty years and have the proceeds held
in trust under the terms of the original disposition. In this circumstance the
executory interest would cease to exist after fifty years, and A would own the fee
simple absolute. That is to say, the legal future interest in land, which becomes
possessory upon the happening of an event concerning the use of the land, be-
comes void after fifty years.
Sometimes this type of donative future interest takes the form of a possibil-
ity of reverter or power of termination (right of entry): A in fee, so long as the
premises are used only for single-family residential purposes. After fifty years
A's fee simple determinable would become a fee simple absolute, and the donor's
possibility of reverter would cease to existA
0
Of course, there may be a legal executory interest or a legal possibility of
reverter or power of termination in land that becomes possessory on account of
an event unrelated to the use of the land: donor conveys Blackacre to A in fee,
so long as neither A nor any descendant of A becomes a member of the bar.
After 50 years A would have the power to sell Blackacre in fee simple absolute,
and the proceeds would be held in trust in accordance with the terms of the
original disposition for not more than 125 years. A and his successors would be
entitled to the income until the time of the deadline. If the present and future
interests are still in existence after 125 years, A's successors would have the
possessory fee simple absolute, subject to the judicial reformation principle.
It should be emphasized that the proposed requirement of vesting in posses-
sion in fee simple absolute after 125 years applies to transfers in which the only
future interest is a reversion. When a testator transfers in trust to pay the in-
come to his descendants per stirpes for 150 years, no remainder interest is cre-
ated. The trust ends at 125 years, and those receiving income are then entitled
to the possessory fee simple absolute, subject to judicial reformation if a different
disposition appears more consonant with the transferor's dispositive purpose.
C. Powers of Appointment and Revocable Trusts
When A has the unconditional power to make himself the absolute owner of
property the title to which is in B, A is functionally the absolute owner of the
property. For the purposes of the proposed rule, if a settlor reserves the power
to revoke the trust, the perpetuities period does not begin to run until he ceases
to have the power. If, at the time any transfer is made, a person has a presently
exercisable general power of appointment over the property transferred, the per-
petuities period does not run. If a presently exercisable general power is exer-
cised to create present and future interests, the period of the rule begins to run
60. Several states have statutes limiting the duration of a possibility of reverter or Power of
Termination to a specific number of years, such as 30. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45-97 (1975); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.218, 381.219 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1972); NEE. Rv. STAT. § 76-2, 102
(1986); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-4-19 (1984).
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from the time of the exercise. This result is identical to that of the traditional
Rule. The proposed rule would not change the "relation back" of the exercise of
the special power and the general testamentary power, as under the traditional
Rule. In short, existing law would not change with respect to the relationship of
powers of appointment to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Suppose at the time a transfer is made there is no presently exercisable
general power, but the terms of the transfer provide for a person to have a pres-
ently exercisable general power at a later time. Because that person can make
himself the absolute owner, it is arguable that the acquisition of the power at the
later time should be deemed to be the equivalent of the legal and equitable fee in
possession for purposes of the proposed rule. It may then follow from that
premise that the perpetuities clock would stop at the time the power was ac-
quired; if the power is never exercised, the perpetuities clock would begin anew
at year one at the expiration of the power, as far as the remaining provisions of
the transfer are concerned. This would significantly change existing law, and it
is not proposed that this change should occur. The perpetuities clock would
stop and start again at year one only when the power is exercised. As long as the
power is not exercised the clock continues. If the rule were otherwise, it would
provide an opportunity for the creation of the gimmick of the very short-term
presently exercisable general power that would not be exercised in order to
achieve an excessively long-term disposition.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Rule Against Perpetuities is a complex and esoteric body of law. The
complexity and esoterica are unnecessary to achieve the social objective of the
Rule. The adoption of vesting in possession within a specific number of years,
and provision for a power of sale by operation of law when it does not otherwise
exist, would greatly simplify the Rule and better achieve its objective. It should
be noted that in 1986 Delaware enacted a statute which, with respect to trusts,
replaces the traditional Rule Against Perpetuities with the rule that the trust
must terminate after 110 years.
61
There is no magic in the 125-year period proposed in this Article. It was
selected to have the effect of removing the Rule Against Perpetuities as a consid-
eration in almost all donative dispositions. It may be considered to be too long a
period. Maybe 110 or 100 years would be more acceptable. In any event, the
period should be long enough to allow a donor to create a trust for the life of a
very young beneficiary.
61. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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